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a b s t r a c t
Generalized signcryption is a newcryptographic primitive,whichprovides separate or joint
encryption and signature as per need. It is more suitable for some storage constrained
environments, e.g. smart card, WSN (Wireless Sensor Networks) etc. In this paper, we
propose an efficient identity based generalized signcryption scheme. We also simplify the
security notions for identity based generalized signcryption and prove the security of the
proposed scheme under the new security model.
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1. Introduction
The main advantages of public key cryptography are encryption and digital signatures, used to achieve confidentiality
and authenticity of a message respectively. There are scenarios, where both primitives are needed (for example secure
e-mailing). Earlier signature-then-encryption approach was followed to achieve both primitives. However, this approach
has high computational cost and communication overhead. In 1997, Zheng [21] proposed a novel cryptographic primitive
‘‘Signcryption’’ which achieves both confidentiality and authenticity in a single logical step with the cost significantly lower
than the ‘‘signature-then-encryption’’ approach. In 2002, Beak et al. [1] first formalized and defined security notions for
signcryption, via semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive
chosen message attack. Many public key signcryption schemes have been proposed after [21]. Some of them are [2,12,13,
22].
Identity based cryptography was first introduced by Shamir [18] in 1984. In the identity based cryptosystems, public
keys of users are their identities (e.g. email address, PAN number etc.) and secret keys of users are created by a trusted third
party called private key generator (PKG). The first identity based signature scheme was given by Shamir [18] in 1984, but
the first identity based encryption schemewas given by Boneh and Franklin [4] in 2001. The first identity based signcryption
scheme was proposed by Malone Lee [16] in 2002 and they also gave the security model for signcryption in identity based
setting. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed in the literature [3,5,7,8,15]. Their main
objective is to reduce the computational complexity and to design the more efficient identity based signcryption schemes.
Now consider the scenarios where sometimes we need confidentiality and authenticity separately and sometimes,
we need both simultaneously. To achieve this, we can use three different schemes: an encryption scheme, a signature
scheme and a signcryption scheme. However, in the low bandwidth environment e.g. smartcards and WSN (Wireless
Sensor Networks), we cannot afford to use three different schemes to achieve confidentiality and authenticity separately
or simultaneously. Han et al. [11] address the issue of implementation complexity of these cryptographic schemes and
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proposed the concept of generalized signcryption, which can work as an encryption scheme or a signature scheme or a
signcryption scheme as per need. Wang et al. [19] gave the security model for a generalized signcryption scheme and
modified the scheme proposed in [11]. Han et al. proposed another generalized signcryption scheme based on bilinear
pairing with the shortened ciphertext in [9] and amulti-recipient generalized signcryption scheme based on the gap Diffie–
Hellman problem in [10]. The first identity based generalized signcryption along with a security model was proposed by
Lal and Kushwah [14] in 2008. However, Yu et al. [20] showed that the security model for identity based generalized
signcryption proposed in [14] is not complete. They modified the security model and proposed a concrete scheme which is
secure in the modified model. In this work, we simplify the security model for identity based generalized signcryption and
propose an efficient identity based generalized signcryption scheme. We also prove the security of the proposed scheme in
the simplified model under the q-DHIP and q-BDHIP.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,wedefine the identity based generalized signcryption scheme andpropose
a simplified security model for identity based generalized signcryption (IBGSC). Section 3 contains the preliminaries for the
proposed scheme. In Section 4, we give the construction of the IBGSC scheme and in Section 5, we give the security results
for our scheme in the new security model. In Section 6, we compare our scheme with the existing generalized signcryption
schemes.
2. Identity based generalized signcryption (IBGSC)
An identity based generalized signcryption (IBGSC) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1. Setup: This algorithm takes input a security parameter k and outputs the system parameters params and a master secret
key.
2. Key generation: Given input params, master secret key and a user’s identity IDU , it outputs a partial private key DU
corresponding to IDU .
3. IBGSC: To send a message m from a user A to B, this algorithm takes input (DA,m, IDA, IDB) and outputs a σ =
IBGSC(DA,m, IDA, IDB).
4. IBGUSC: This algorithm takes input (σ ,DB, IDB, IDA) and outputs m and valid if σ is a valid generalized signcryption of
m done by A for B, otherwise⊥ if σ is not valid.
There is no specific sender (or receiver) whenwe only encrypt (or sign) amessagem using IBGSC.We denote the absence
of sender (or receiver) by IDϕ . To only sign or encrypt amessagem, use IDB = IDϕ or IDA = IDϕ respectively. Therefore, when
IDB = IDϕ , IBGSC becomes a signature scheme and output of the IBGSC algorithm is a signature of sender IDA on themessage
m and when IDA = IDϕ , IBGSC becomes an encryption scheme and output of the IBGSC algorithm is merely an encryption
of message m for receiver IDB. If IDA ≠ IDϕ , IDB ≠ IDϕ , then IBGSC works as the signcryption scheme and output of IBGSC
is the signcryption of messagemwith the signature of sender IDA to the receiver IDB. Thus IBGSC works in three modes via
signcryption mode, encryption-only mode and signature-only mode.
Security model for IBGSC
A security model for IBGSC was given in [14]. This model has recently been modified by Yu et al. [20]. In this section,
we provide a new and simplified security model for IBGSC. The modified security notions for identity based generalized
signcryption by Yu et al. [20] provide 7 oracles to the adversary namely Extract, Sign, Verify, Encrypt, Decrypt, GSC and
GUSC. But the basic nature of generalized signcryption is to use a single algorithm to sign, to encrypt or to signcrypt a
message as per need, which can be achieved by giving specific input to the generalized signcryption algorithm. Similarly a
single algorithm is used to decrypt and to verify a message. Therefore the oracles Encrypt, Decrypt, Sign and Verify seem
redundant. In our simplified security model, we provide only two strong oracles namely IBGSC and IBGUSC to the adversary
which she can query with specific inputs. The IBGSC oracle is so strong that it provides signcryption when IDA ≠ IDϕ and
IDB ≠ IDϕ , encryption when IDA = IDϕ and IDB ≠ IDϕ , signature when IDA ≠ IDϕ and IDB = IDϕ . Similarly, the IBGUSC
oracle is so strong such that when IDA = IDϕ it only decrypts the message and when IDB = IDϕ it only verifies the signature.
Otherwise it decrypts the message and verifies the signature.
2.1. Message confidentiality
The notion of security with respect to confidentiality is indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). For IBGSC, this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger C and
adversaryA.
GAME 1 (IND-CCA2)
Initialization: C runs the setup algorithm on input a security parameter k, gives public parameters params to the adversary
A. C keeps the master key secret.
Queries (Find Stage): The adversaryAmakes the following queries adaptively.
• Hash queries: A can request the hash values of any input and C responds with appropriate hash values.
• Private key extraction queries: A submits an identity IDU and C computes the private key DU corresponding to IDU and
returns toA.
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• IBGSC queries: A submits two identities IDA, IDB and a messagem. Challenger C runs the IBGSC algorithm with message
m and identities IDA and IDB and returns the output σ to the adversary A. Note that if A sets IDA = IDϕ , then C only
encrypts the messagem for IDB and ifA sets IDB = IDϕ , then C only signs the messagem under IDA.• IBGUSC queries: A submits two identities IDA, IDB along with σ to the challenger C. C runs the IBGUSC algorithm with
input σ , IDA and IDB and returns the output m and valid of IBGUSC. Note that if A sets IDA = IDϕ , then σ is only the
encryption for IDB and ifA sets IDB = IDϕ , then σ is only the signature of IDA on messagem.
No queries with IDA = IDB is allowed.
Challenge: At the end of find stage,A submits two distinct messagesm0 andm1 of equal length, a sender’s identity ID∗A and
a receiver’s identity ID∗B on which she wishes to be challenged. The adversaryAmust have made no private key extraction
query on ID∗B , also ID
∗
B ≠ IDϕ for the confidentiality game. C picks randomly a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs the IBGSC algorithm with
messagemb under ID∗A and ID
∗
B and returns the output σ
∗ to the adversaryA.
Queries (Guess stage): Aqueries adaptively again as in the find stage. It is not allowed to extract the private key corresponding
to ID∗B and it is also not allowed to make an IBGUSC query on σ ∗ with sender ID
∗
A and receiver ID
∗
B .
Eventually,A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b = b′.
A’s advantage is defined as AdvIND−CCA2A = 2 Pr[b = b′] − 1.
Note:
1. AdversaryA plays the above game with ID∗A = IDϕ for the confidentiality in the encryption only mode.
2. In the above game, adversaryA cannot submit σ ∗ to the IBGUSC oracle strictlywith sender ID∗A and receiver ID
∗
B . However,
if σ ∗ is the signcrypted text, thenA is allowed to transform the σ ∗ into a valid encrypted text and can query the IBGUSC
oracle with sender IDϕ . Also, if σ ∗ is the encrypted text, then A is allowed to transform the σ ∗ into a valid signcrypted
text and can query the IBGUSC oracle with sender ID∗A ≠ IDϕ .
Definition 1. An IBGSC scheme is said to IND-CCA2 secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has non-negligible
advantage of winning the above game.
2.2. Signature unforgeability
The notion of security with respect to authenticity is existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-
CMA). For IBGSC, this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger C and adversaryA.
GAME 2 (EUF-CMA):
Initialization: Same as in GAME 1.
Queries: The adversaryA asks a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in GAME 1.
Forgery: Finally, A produces a triplet (ID∗A, ID
∗
B, σ ) that was not obtained from the IBGSC query during the game and for
which private key of ID∗A was not exposed, also ID
∗
A ≠ IDϕ for the signature unforgeability game. The forger wins if the
output of IBGUSC(σ ,D∗B, ID
∗
B, ID
∗
A) is not the⊥ symbol.
The adversaryA’s advantage is its probability of winning the above game.
Note:
1. AdversaryA plays the above game with ID∗B = IDϕ for the unforgeability in the signature only mode.
2. In the above gameσ is not a valid forgery if, it is the output of the IBGSC query strictlywith identities ID∗A and ID
∗
B . But, it can
be the transformation of valid signcrypted text obtained from the IBGSC query to the signature for the unforgeability in the
signature only mode. Also it can be the transformation of valid signature obtained from the IBGSC query to the signcrypted
text for some receiver ID∗B for the unforgeability in the signcryption mode.
Definition 2. An IBGSC scheme is said to EUF-CMA secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has non-negligible
advantage of winning the above game.
3. Preliminaries
LetG1 be an additive group andG2 be amultiplicative group both of the same prime order p. A function e : G1×G1 → G2
is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
1. ∀P,Q ∈ G1,∀a, b ∈ Z∗p, e(aP, bQ ) = e(P,Q )ab
2. For any O ≠ P ∈ G1, there is Q ∈ G1, such that e(P,Q ) ≠ 1
3. There exist an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q )∀P,Q ∈ G1.
Given a (q+ 1) tuple (P, aP, a2P, . . . , aqP) to compute 1aP is known as q-Diffie–Hellman inversion problem (q-DHIP).
Given a (q + 1) tuple (P, aP, a2P, . . . , aqP) to compute e(P, P)1/a ∈ G2 is known as q-Bilinear Diffie–Hellman inversion
problem (q-BDHIP).
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4. Proposed IBGSC scheme
In this section, we will propose an efficient identity based generalized signcryption scheme based on the identity based
signcryption scheme proposed in [3].
Setup: Given a security parameter 1k, the PKG chooses two groups G1 and G2 of prime order p, a random generator P of
G1, and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. PKG computes g = e(P, P) and defines hash functions as H1 : {0, 1}k3 → Z∗p ,
H2 : {0, 1}n+k2+2k3 → Z∗p , H3 : {0, 1}n+k2+k1+2k3 → Z∗p , H4 : {0, 1}k2 → {0, 1}n+k1+k2+k3 , where k1, k2 and k3 denote
the number of bits to represent elements of G1, G2 and identity respectively and n is the message bit length. PKG chooses
random s ∈ Z∗p as the master secret key and sets Ppub = sP . PKG publishes the system parameters as

G1,G2, p, n, P, Ppub,
e : G1 × G1 → G2, g,H1,H2,H3,H4⟩.
Let f be a function such that f (ID) = 0 if ID = IDϕ otherwise f (ID) = 1.
Key generation: Given a user U with identity IDU , the private key is computed by PKG as DU = (QU + s)−1P , where
QU = H1(IDU). For IDϕ , we set Dϕ = O.
IBGSC: The sender A for the receiver B
1. Chooses r ∈R Z∗p;
2. Computes
i. α = g r
ii. r ′ = H2(m, α, IDA, IDB)
iii. X = r ′f (IDB)TB where TB = H1(IDB)P + Ppub, Note that X = O if B = ϕ
iv. h3 = H3(m, α, X, IDA, IDB)
v. Z = (r + h3)DA
vi. y = m‖α‖Z‖IDA ⊕ {H4(g r ′)f (IDB)}, and
3. Returns σ = (y, X)
IBGUSC: On receiving σ from A, the user B
1. Recoversm‖α‖Z‖IDA = y if X = O, otherwise
2. Computes ω = e(X,DB) and recoversm‖α‖Z‖IDA = y⊕ {H4(ω)f (IDB)}
3. If Z = O, computes r ′ = H2(m, α, IDA, IDB) and accepts the message iff X = r ′f (IDB)TB, otherwise
4. Computes h3 = H3(m, α, X, IDA, IDB) and accepts the message iff e(Z,H1(IDA)P + Ppub)g−h3 = α.
Consistency:
ω = e(X,DB) = e(r ′TB,DB) = e(r ′(QB + s)P, (QB + s)−1P) = e(P, P)r ′ = g r ′
e(Z,H1(IDA)P + Ppub)g−h3 = e((r + h3)DA, (QA + s)P)g−h3
= e((r + h3)(QA + s)−1P, (QA + s)P)g−h3 = e(P, P)(r+h3)g−h3 = g r+h3g−h3 = g r = α.
Remarks:
1. Whenwe only sign amessage, then specific receiver B does not exist therefore, we use IDB = IDϕ in the IBGSC algorithm.
Thus the function f (IDϕ) becomes 0 which helps to give us the component X = O and the signature y = m‖α‖Z‖IDA of
the output of the IBGSC algorithm. This reduces the extra computations in IBGUSC.
2. When we only encrypt a message, then specific sender A does not exist therefore, we use IDA = IDϕ in the IBGSC
algorithm. Thus in the computation of Z , we use Dϕ = O and obtain Z = O. This reduces the extra computations in
IBGUSC. By checking X = r ′f (IDB)TB, we also get chosen ciphertext security while we only encrypt a message.
3. The form of ciphertext is (y, X) either we encrypt a message or signcrypt a message. The computations of r ′ and h3
involve both sender’s and receiver’s identity. This prevents an adversary to embed an encryption to valid signcryption or
vice versa. Similarly an adversary cannot embed a signature of a message to valid signcryption or vice versa.
4. An important feature of the proposed IBGSC scheme is that, there is no need to bind the information of sender and receiver
to recognize that the ciphertext is the signcrypted text or the encrypted text or only the signature because the IBGUSC
algorithm itself distinguish these modes.
5. Security results
Theorem 1 (Message Confidentiality). Assume that an IND-CCA2 adversary A has an advantage ε against the proposed IBGSC
scheme when running in time τ , asking qhi queries to the random oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and qe, qu IBGSC queries, IBGUSC
queries respectively. Then there is an algorithmB to solve the q-BDHIP for q = qh1 with probability
ε′ >
ε
qh1(qh4 + qe)

1− qu
2k

1− qe(qe + qh3)
2k

within a time τ ′ < τ + O(qe + qu)τp + O(q2h1)τmulti + O(qe)τexp, where τexp, τmulti and τp are the time for an exponentiation in
G2, a multiplication in G1 and for a pairing computation.
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Proof. Let A be an IND-CCA2 adversary against the proposed IBGSC scheme with advantage ε. We will show how
adversaryA is used to construct a simulatorB that extract e(P, P)1/a on input (P, aP, a2P, . . . , aqP).
We will proceed similarly as in [3]. In the preparation phase, first B selects ℓ ∈R {1, . . . , qh1}, elements λℓ ∈R Z∗p ,
µ1, µ2, . . . , µℓ−1, µℓ+1, . . . , µq ∈R Z∗p and expands the polynomial g(x) =
∏q
i=1,i≠ℓ (x+ µi) to obtain the coefficients
c1, c2, . . . ., cq−1 ∈R Z∗p such that g(x) =
∑q−1
i=0 cixi.B also computes λi = λℓ − µi ∈ Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, ℓ+ 1, . . . , q.
Now B sets G = ∑q−1i=0 ci(aiP) = g(a)P as a public generator of G1 and computes another element U ∈ G1 as
U =∑qi=1 ci−1(aiP) = aG. Note thatB does not know a. FurtherB computes
gi(x) = g(x)
(x+ µi) =
q−2
i=0
dixi
for i = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, ℓ+ 1, . . . , q such that
1
(a+ µi)G =
g(a)
(a+ µi) = gi(a)P =
q−2
i=0
di(aiP).
Thus B can compute q − 1 = qh1 − 1 pairs

µi,Di = 1a+µi G

by the last term of the above equation. The system wide
public key Ppub is chosen as Ppub = −U − λℓG = (−a − λℓ)G with (unknown) private key z = −a − λℓ ∈ Z∗p . For all
i = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, ℓ+ 1, . . . , q,B have (λi,−Di) = (λi, 1λi+zG).
Now simulator B starts the interaction with A on input (G, Ppub). A asks queries to B throughout the simulation. It
is assumed that H1 queries are distinct and any query involving the identity ID comes after an H1 query on ID. The target
identity ID∗B is submitted to H1 at some point of simulation. Also to maintain consistency in queries,B makes the lists Li for
the random oracles Hi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.B initializes a counter η to 1 and starts answeringA’s queries as follows.
• H1 queries: It takes input an identity ID.B answers λη to the ηth one such query and increment η.B sets the identity ID
as IDη .• H2 queries: It takes input (m, α, IDζ , IDη).B checks the list L2, it returns a previous value if it exists. Otherwise it chooses
a random h2 ∈R Z∗p and returns this value as the answer. It also stores this value in the L2 list.• H3 queries: It takes input (m, α, X, IDζ , IDη). B checks the list L3, it returns a previous value if it exists. Otherwise it
chooses a random h3 ∈R Z∗p and returns this value as the answer. It also stores this value in the L3 list.
• H4 queries: It takes input g r ′ . B checks the list L4, it returns a previous value if it exists. Otherwise it chooses a random
h4 ∈R {0, 1}n+k1+k2+k3 and returns this value as the answer. It also stores this value in the L4 list.• Keygen queries: It takes input an identity IDη . B fails if η = ℓ otherwise it knows that H1(IDη) = λη and returns
−Dη = 1λη+zG.• IBGSC queries: It takes input a plaintext m and identities (IDA, IDB) = (IDζ , IDη) where ζ , η ∈ {1, . . . , qhi}. If ζ ≠ ℓ,
B knows the sender’s private key of IDζ is −Dζ and can answer the query by following the specification of the IBGSC
algorithm. So we assume that ζ = ℓ, thenB does the following:
i. Chooses h3 ∈R Z∗p and Z ∈R G1
ii. Computes e(Z,H1(IDℓ)G+ Ppub)e(G,G)−h3 = α
iii. Simulates H2 as H2(m, α, IDℓ, IDη) = r ′ and stores in the L2 list.
iv. Computes X = r ′Tη where Tη = H1(IDη)G+ Ppub
v. Sets H3(m, α, X, IDℓ, IDη) = h3 and stores in L3 list.
vi. Simulates H4 as H4(e(G,G)r
′
) = h4 and stores in L4 list.
vii. Computes y = m‖α‖Z‖IDℓ ⊕ {h4f (IDη)}
viii. Returns σ = (y, X).
Note that if IDη = IDϕ , B answers the IBGSC query in the same way using IDϕ in place of IDη and returns the signature
(m‖α‖Z‖IDℓ,O). AlsoB fails if H3 is already defined but this happens with a probability smaller than (qe + qh3)/2k.
• IBGUSC queries: It takes input a ciphertext (y, X) and a receiver’s identity IDη . If IDη ≠ IDℓ, then B knows receiver’s
private key of IDη is −Dη . B runs the IBGUSC algorithm normally and returns the output to A. Also if IDη = IDϕ , then
B is able to give an appropriate answer to A. If IDη = IDℓ, then B rejects the ciphertext. Across the whole game an
inappropriate rejection occurs with probability at most qu/2k.
At the end of challenge phase,A outputs twomessagesm0,m1 and identities ID∗A, ID
∗
B such that she has not made Keygen
query on ID∗B . Note that for the confidentiality in the encryption mode, adversary A will choose ID
∗
A = IDϕ . If ID∗B ≠ IDℓ,
B aborts the simulation. Otherwise it picks ξ ∈R Z∗p , y ∈R {0, 1}n+k1+k2+k3 to return the challenge σ ∗ = (y, X) where
X = −ξG ∈ G1. If we define δ = ξ/a and since z = −a− λℓ, we can check that
X = −ξG = −aδG = (λℓ + z)δG = δλℓG+ δPpub.
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A cannot recognize that σ ∗ is not a valid ciphertext unless she queries H2,H3 or H4 on e(G,G)δ . Also in the guess stage, her
view is simulated as before and her eventual output is ignored. Standard arguments can show that a successful A is very
likely to query H2,H3 or H4 on the input e(G,G)δ if the simulation is indistinguishable from a real attack environment.
To produce a result, B fetches a random record from the L4 list. As L4 contains no more than (qh4 + qe) records
by construction thus with probability 1
(qh4+qe)
, B chooses the record which will contain the right element e(G,G)δ =
e(P, P)g(a)
2ξ/a where G = g(a)P .
The q-BDHIP solution can be extracted as follows. If ω∗ = e(P, P)1/a, then
e(G,G)1/a = (ω∗)c20 e

q−2
i=0
ci+1(aiP), c0P

e

G,
q−2
j=0
cj+1(ajP)

.
In an analysis ofB’s advantage, following events will causeB to abort the simulation:
E1: A does not choose to be challenge on IDℓ
E2: a Keygen query is made on IDℓ
E3: B aborts in the IBGSC query because of a collision on H3
E4: B rejects a valid ciphertext at some point of the game.
We clearly have probability Pr[¬E1] = 1/qh1 and we know that ¬E1 implies ¬E2. Also Pr[E3] ≤ qe(qe + qh3)/2k and
Pr[E4] ≤ qu/2k. Thus we find that
Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E3 ∧ ¬E4] ≥ 1qh1

1− qu
2k

1− qe(qe + qh3)
2k

.
Also the probability thatB selects the correct record from the L4 list is 1(qh4+qe)
. Therefore the advantage ofB is
ε′ >
ε
qh1(qh4 + qe)

1− qu
2k

1− qe(qe + qh3)
2k

.
The time bound is obtained as there are O(q2h1) multiplications in the preparation phase, O(qe + qu) pairing computations
and O(qe) exponentiations in G2. 
Theorem 2 (Signature Unforgeability). Assume that there is an EUF-CMA adversaryA against the proposed IBGSC scheme. Also
assume thatA produces a forgery with probability ε ≥ 10(qe + 1)(qe + qh3)/2k when asking qhi queries to the random oracles
Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and qe, qu IBGSC queries, IBGUSC queries respectively, within the time τ . Then there is an algorithmB to solve
the q-BDHIP for q = qh1 in the expected time τ ′ ≤ 120686qh1qh3(τ +O(qe+ qu)τp+O(quqh3)τexp)/ε(1− 1/2k)+O(q2h1)τmulti
where τexp, τmulti and τp are the same as in Theorem 1.
Proof. Proof is the combination of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that there is a forgerA for an adaptively chosen message and identity attack having advantage ε against our
scheme when asking qhi queries to the random oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and qe, qu IBGSC queries, IBGUSC queries respectively.
Then there exists an algorithmA′ for adaptively chosen message and given identity attack, asking same number of queries asA
and has the advantage ε′ > εqh1

1− qu
2k

.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 is similar to the proof of lemma 1 in [6]. 
Lemma 2. Assume that there is chosenmessage and given identity attackerA against the proposed IBGSC scheme. LetA produces
a forgery with probability ε ≥ 10(qe + 1)(qe + qh3)/2k when asking qhi queries to the random oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and
qe, qu IBGSC queries, IBGUSC queries respectively, within the time τ . Then there is an algorithmB to solve the q-BDHIP for q = qh1
in the expected time τ ′ ≤ 120686qh3(τ + O(qe + qu)τp + O(qe)τexp)/ε + O(q2h1)τmulti where τexp, τmulti and τp are the same as
in Theorem 1.
Proof. We are going to use ‘‘forking lemma’’ technique of Pointcheval and Stern [17] to prove our result.
We will in fact reduce the q-DHIP in bilinear group G1 to the problem of forging. Since a black box for the q-DHIP is
sufficient to solve the q-BDHIP the result will follow. We will now show how an EUF-CMA adversary A of IBGSC may be
used to construct a simulatorB that solves the q-DHIP. Let (P, aP, a2P, . . . , aqP) be the instant of the q-DHIP that we wish
to solve.
In the preparation phase,B setup similarly as in Theorem 1. Then simulatorB starts answeringA’s queries throughout
the simulation. Also B makes the lists Li for the random oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) to maintain consistency. B initializes a
counter η to runA on input (G, Ppub, IDℓ) for a random chosen challenge identity IDℓ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Also to simulateA’s environment in a chosen message and given identity attack,B answersA’s queries to the random
oracles H1,H2,H3,H4, IBGSC and IBGUSC as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let us assume that A forges a ciphertext (y, X)
for a recipient’s identity IDB (or a signature (m‖α‖Z‖IDℓ,O) with recipient’s identity IDϕ) in time τ with probability
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Table 1
Scheme Sign/Encrypt Decrypt/Verify
mul in G1 exps in G2 e cps mul in G1 exps in G2 e cps
Barreto et al. [3] 2 1 0 0 1 2
Lal et al. [14] 5 0 1 1 0 4
Yu et al. [20] 3 1 1 0 2 4
Proposed IBGSC 2 2 0 1 or 0 1 or 0 2 or 1
ε ≥ 10(qe + 1)(qe + qh3)/2k when making qe IBGSC queries and qh3 random oracle queries on H3. Also IDB cannot be IDℓ
because of the irreflexivity assumption, so B can extract clean message signature pair from ciphertext. Therefore in both
the cases when IDB = IDϕ or IDB ≠ IDϕ , B has a message signature pair (m, α, h3, Z, IDℓ). Note that A does not know the
private key corresponding to IDℓ. Then by forking lemma there exists a turning machine A′ that runs A sufficient number
of times on input (G, Ppub, IDℓ) to obtain two suitable related forgeries which gives (m, α, h3, Z, IDℓ) and (m, α, h′3, Z ′, IDℓ)
with h3 ≠ h′3, in the expected time τ ′ ≤ 120686qh3τ/ε. To solve the q-DHIP simulator B runs A′ to obtain two forgeries
(m∗, α, h3, Z, IDℓ) and (m∗, α, h′3, Z ′, IDℓ) with h3 ≠ h′3 for the same message m∗ and commitment α. Since both forgeries
satisfy the verification equation, we have
e(Z, TIDℓ)e(G,G)
−h3 = e(Z ′, TIDℓ)e(G,G)−h
′
3
where TIDℓ = (λℓ + z)G = −aG. Then it gives
e(Z − Z ′, TIDℓ) = e(G,G)h3−h
′
3
e((h3 − h′3)(Z − Z ′), TIDℓ) = e(G,G)
and hence V ∗ = (h3 − h′3)(Z − Z ′) = 1aG. From V ∗,B can extract δ∗ = 1aP; as it knows
g(x)/x = (c0/x)+
q−2
i=0
cixi
and eventually computes δ∗ = 1c0

V ∗ −∑q−2i=0 ci(aiP) = 1aP which is return as a result.
Thus ifAmakes a forgery in time τ with probability ε ≥ 10(qe + 1)(qe + qh3)/2k, thenB solves the q-DHIP in expected
time τ ′ ≤ 120686qh3(τ + O(qe + qu)τp + O(qe)τexp)/ε + O(q2h1)τmulti. 
6. Efficiency and comparison
The basic idea behind generalized signcryption is to reduce the implementation complexity using a single IBGSC scheme
as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme and a signcryption scheme as per need. This renders some extra calculations
while we use generalized signcryption for encryption and signature. However, the proposed IBGSC scheme significantly
decreases the extra calculation in encryption and signature. Also, the proposed IBGSC scheme is as efficient as the identity
based signcryption scheme in [3] which is the most efficient identity based signcryption scheme till date. In Table 1, we
compare the dominant operations required for IBGSC and other schemes.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient identity based generalized signcryption scheme.We compare our schemewith the
identity based generalized signcryption scheme proposed earlier and showed that our scheme is the most efficient among
the available identity based generalized signcryption schemes. We also gave the proofs of security based on q-DHIP and
q-BDHIP in the random oracle model.
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